Introduction
"The scope, the extent, the insidious nature of corporate influence in regulatory agencies of government -this question of regulatory capture -is something we should attend to here. It is the lesson. And it raises the question, beyond the Minerals Management Service, how far does this corporate influence reach into our agencies of government?" Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-Rhode Island), June 17, 2010. Are corporations able to use carrots such as campaign contributions to wriggle their way out of regulatory constraints? Public opinion, mirrored in the comments of Senator Whitehouse, certainly suggests politically active firms are able to buy their way out of environmental regulations and other forms of scrutiny. But at the same time, many firms complain they are subject to intense interference by regulators. Are these two world views compatible? Might influence and interference go hand in hand, with some firms being both more influential but also subject to more regulatory constraint?
It is well understood in the literature as well as in public debate that political influence is a means for interest groups and firms to achieve an ends. In the case of firms, the desired end is a more profitable operating environment -not necessarily a socially optimal outcome. For this reason there is an extensive political science literature which examines both the determinants of firm attempts to achieve influence -notably contributions to political action committees (PAC) in the US -and the impacts of these transfers -notably on US congressional voting patterns. Generally the latter literature has found firms' PAC contributions to be less effective at influencing political behavior than expected (Hall and Wayman 1990) .
Recently there has been a number of studies which ask similar questions about the determinants and impacts of influence for countries other than the US (Hellman et al. 2003 , Chong and Gradstein 2007 , Campos and Giovannoni 2007 , Desbordes and Vauday 2007 , Desai and Olofsgard 2008 . This growth in the literature has been facilitated by the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPs) which ask managers of firms in a wide range of countries about their relationship with the national government, including how much influence the firms have over rules, laws, regulations and decrees of importance to the firms operations.
In order to understand which firms enjoy political benefits and why, we distinguish between two types of influence. Firstly, a firm may be influential if the firm and the government regularly see eye to eye on the principles. Firms may have such intrinsic influence for a number of reasons including government shareholdings and -as shown by Faccio (2006) -personal connections. But a firm may also be influential if the regulator and firm disagree on the principles but the firm is able to divert the regulator from her (uncorrupted) ideal though some form of transfer. This exerted influence is the focus of the political science literature on PAC contributions. The challenge -both for the literature examining the impact of PAC contributions on political behavior and for that using the World Bank's datasets to examine the impact of firms' influence on regulatory outcomes -is that exerted influence is endogenous.
We illustrate the endogeneity of influence by building a simple model of a single firm that makes a binding take-it-or-leave it offer to a regulator. The offer consists of a transfer from the firm to the government and a level of regulatory constraint to be imposed on the firm.
The regulator accepts the offer only so long as its welfare is at least as high as it would be if it rejected the offer, forwent the transfer, and imposed its threatpoint, regulation on the firm. As is standard in the political economy of regulation literature following Stigler (1971) we assume the government puts more weight on the transfer received than it does on the firm's cost of making the transfer; in our model; there may also be frictions in transferring rents to the regulator.
Since we are interested in firm-level characteristics, our model -unlike models with menuauctions -abstracts from political competition issues. That is, we focus on the relationship between a single firm and a single regulator, assuming along the way that this relationship is unaffected by the presence of other firms or lobbyists in the economy. This is equivalent to Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which there lobby groups are "functionally specialized" (Aidt 1998 ) and each firm forms its own lobby. 1 Like Becker (1983) , who defined a group's influence as the deadweight costs to society of the subsidy it receives, we assume the influence exerted by a group depends on endogeneous variables. In Becker (1983) , for example, a group's influence is a function of -among other things -the expenditures of the group on achieving their political objectives. We instead define a group's exerted influence as the gap between the regulator's threatpoint regulation -the amount of regulatory interference to which the firm would be subjected but for the political relationship -and equilibrium 1 While the absence of political competition in our model is a deviation from the previous literature which is primarily motivated by a desire to reduce complexity, we do not think it is unreasonable in the context of actions by individual firms. Individual firms are likely to achieve their influence through targeted pressure on individual or small groups of government actors. Furthermore, the types of regulatory changes they aim to achieve are more likely to be low visibility ones such as lax enforcement of regulations or the insertion of a beneficial loophole in a regulation under development. These sorts of actions are specifically designed not to be observed by other political actors.
regulation.
Our model delivers predictions as to how primitive firm characteristics such as size, sector, age and ownership structure affect equilibrium regulation and transfers. Our model also suggests that the relationship between a firm's political influence and its level of regulatory constraint depends on the source of its influence. For example, lowering the number of competitors and increasing firm size will both independently increase a firm's influence.
However, while lower competition is a source of regulatory slack, larger size may actually lead to increased regulatory constraint.
We test our theoretical predictions using the WBES data. The richness of the WBES data allows us to test the robustness of these relationships across a range of regulatory areas, most notably environmental regulations, health and safety standards, business taxes and trade and foreign exchange regulations. The influence data is available for four different branches of government, Executive, Legislature, Ministry, and Regulator. Our model performs well empirically. Treating stated influence and regulatory constraint as independent variables in separate regressions, we find support for many of the theoretical predictions of our model and in no case do we find significant results contrary to our predictions.
Influence and Interference
A firm and a regulator play a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firm makes the regulator a take-it-or-leave-it offer {T * , X * } where T * is a transfer received by the regulator in exchange for regulation X * . Higher values of X denote stricter regulation. The firm's net rents are R = δπ(X)−gT * where π measures operating profits with π < 0 > π , δ > 0 is a measure of economic scale, and g − 1 ≥ 0 measures the deadweight loss associated with transferring one dollar to the government. We implicitly assume away interactions between the firm-regulator relationship modeled and any other firms in the economy.
where s measures regulation-augmented benefits to the Rest of Society (ROS) from firm's activities; we assume s > 0 ≥ s . ROS benefits include, but are not restricted to, avoided damages from industrial emissions. N measures regulation-inhibited benefits to ROS, for example consumer surplus and positive spillovers such as foreign exchange acquisition and knowledge generation, with N < 0 > N . b, n and γ are positive, exogenous parameters measuring the relative importance of producer surplus, spillovers, and transfers received. e(X)z(δ) measures the governments costs of imposing and enforcing regulation; we assume e > 0 < e while z > 0 > z . By assuming 0 > z , we allow for economies of scale in regulation. We assume throughout that γ − bg > 0. In the interest of brevity, we also assume s , π , N and e are each constants.
Stage 2
We solve the model in reverse. If the regulator rejects the firm's offer, she receives no transfer and gets welfare G(X G , 0) where
with associated second order condition
We will refer to X G as the Regulator's threatpoint regulation, and G(X G , 0) as her threatpoint welfare.
The regulator will accept an offer of (T * , X * ) if and only
where G(X * , 0) measures the Regulator's welfare with regulation X * but no transfers; we call this the Regulator's uncompensated welfare. Because transfers are costly, we can write the Regulator's participation constraint in terms of the minimum transfer consistent with the Regulator accepting the Firm's offer:
In words, the firm must offer the regulator a transfer proportionate to the gap between her uncompensated welfare under threatpoint and actual regulation.
Below we'll make use of the following derivative: differentiating (3) yields
Stage 1
At the first stage the firm chooses {T * , X * } so as to maximize R subject to the Regulator's participation constraint (3). Invoking (4), X * thus solves the first order condition
which has associated second order condition
Equations (1), (3) and (5) jointly define equilibrium regulation and transfers, X * and T * , as well as threatpoint regulation X G . We devote the next section to analyzing how these equilibrium values vary with the characteristics of the firm.
Co-Determinants of Regulation and Influence

Corruption
Many studies of political economy focus on the relationship between a government's inherent corruptability-represented by γ in our model-and equilibrium regulation. Differentiating the system formed by (1) , (3) and (5) gives
As one would expect, when the Regulator puts more weight on contributions relative to firm and ROS welfare, the Regulator is more easily swayed from threatpoint stringency:
equilibrium regulation is thus decreasing in γ.
One of our central questions is whether influence and regulation are negatively correlated.
If we only look at the Regulator's participation constraint, then we would expect a firm must transfer more resources to regulators in order to achieve commensurately laxer regulation.
But the size of the transfer is endogenous. Moreover, transfers are a means to influence, not a measure of influence achieved.
A preferable metric focuses on the amount of influence exerted, specifically, the gap between threatpoint and actual regulation: X G − X * . This gap measures how far the firm is able to sway policy away from the Regulator's ideal level. Differentiating the system formed by (1) , (3) and (5) reveals dX
and thus the gap between equilibrium and threatpoint regulation is increasing in γ:
and our model predicts exerted influence is necessarily increasing in γ.
Whether the equilibrium transfer also rises with δ is ambiguous; differentiating the system formed by (1), (3) and (5) yields
On the one hand, a higher γ translates to the regulator placing a higher net value on monies received, suggesting the firm needn't pay the regulator as much for a fixed level of regulation-, but regulation also becomes more lax, which exacerbates the regulatory distortion and thus argues for a larger transfer.
Regardless of whether the net impact of γ on T * is positive or negative, this analysis supports the conventional wisdom that regulatory stringency and firm-level influence are negatively correlated.
Size
When comparing regulatory stringency across countries, it makes sense to focus on countrylevel parameters such as a government's inherent corruptability as analyzed above. However, when comparisons are made at the firm level, parameters such as size naturally come to mind. In our framework, δ measures the scale of activity associated with a given firm.
Differentiating the system formed by (1) , (3) and (5) yields
where Like threatpoint regulation, equilibrium stringency is also increasing in δ:
As δ rises, the marginal cost of regulatory stringency declines, and equilibrium regulation becomes more stringent.
Taking the difference between (8) and (9) and rearranging gives
Because e (X G )−e (X * ) ≥ 0 by the weak convexity of e,
is unambiguously positive:
the regulatory gap grows along with the scale of economic activity. Combined, (9) and (10) have straightforward empirical implications: provided there are some economies of scale in regulation 2 , larger firms will exert more influence yet face stricter regulation nonetheless.
This prediction directly contradicts presumptions that regulation and influence are negatively correlated. In the case of size, at least, we see that the same forces that widen the gap between ideal and actual stringency-namely, scale economies in regulation-also increase equilibrium regulation.
Even though stringency and influence are unambiguously increasing in δ, we cannot say whether the equilibrium transfer grows more or less than proportionately with size.
Differentiating the system formed by (1), (3) and (5) gives
As per the first term on the right hand side, an increase in δ has a simple scale effect: if the sector gets twice as large, so too does the gap between ROS and producer surplus when regulation is unfettered versus influenced. Accordingly, the transfer required for the Regulator to participate in the political relationship must double as well, other things-namely regulatory stringency-equal. The rise in δ also means that the cost savings arising from lax regulation-measured by [e(X G ) − e(X * )]z(δ)-decline. These cost-savings are capitalized into the transfer, and so a reduction in these cost-savings argues in favor of a larger transfer.
Finally, equilibrium regulation is now more stringent, shrinking the regulatory distortion and arguing in favor of a smaller transfer. Which dominates-increased scale, reduced cost savings, or diminished regulatory distortion-is ambiguous. If regulatory economies are small (i.e. if F is close to zero) then the transfer rises approximately proportionately with scale.
If regulatory economies are instead large, T * may rise more or less than proportionately with δ, depending on whether the reduced cost savings dominate the diminished regulatory distortion.
Franchise
The parameter b reflects the weights the regulator places on the firm's rents, and so an increase in b reflects an increase in the firm's franchise. Differentiating the system formed by (1), (3) and (5) gives
confirming that threatpoint and exerted influence are both decreasing in b, while changes in b have no effect on equilibrium regulation and ambiguous effect on transfers. We discuss each result in turn.
A rise in b increases the value the regulator assigns to the firm's compliance costs, which lowers threatpoint stringency in turn. As b rises, the regulator also puts more weight on the firm's costs of transferring rents to the regulator, and the increased weight on operating profits and transfer costs cancel exactly 3 , with a zero net effect on equilibrium regulation.
The negative sign of d[X G − X * ]/db may seem odd at first glance, however this result is intuitive. b measures the firm's intrinsic influence, i.e. the extent to which the firm's rents are internalized by the regulator. As b rises, the firm's and regulator's interests become more closely aligned, and the gap between each party's ideal regulation contracts. Accordingly, our model predicts that firms with higher intrinsic influence will report lower exerted influence, simply because firms that are intrinsically influential do not face high threatpoint regulation to begin with.
As before, the overall effect on the transfer is ambiguous. A rise in b impacts the gap between threatpoint and influenced operating profits, necessitating a smaller transfer, while the reduction in stringency argues for a larger transfer. In addition, a rise in b lowers the net value of any given transfer to the regulator, arguing further in favor of a larger transfer.
Lobbying Efficiency
The parameter g reflects the deadweight loss associated with transferring each dollar's worth of benefits to the government. Variation in g can originate from a variety of sources, including spillovers in the lobbying process. For example, multinational firms that have engaged in lobbying overseas may be more efficient at transferring rents than are firms without outside experience. Similarly, marginal lobbying costs may be lower for older, established firms.
3 When choosing X * , the firm equates its marginal costs of achieving weak regulation-measured by dT /dX * -with its marginal benefit: lower compliance costs, measured by −δπ (X * ).
When the firm is more efficient at transferring rents to the Regulator, the firm's marginal cost of delivering T * to the regulator is lower, and so the firm engages more actively in the political process. At the same time, reducing g raises the Regulator's net value of T * and so the firm needn't spend as much in order to induce a given stringency level. Accordingly, our model predicts dX * /dg is unambiguously positive, the gap [X G −X * ] declines unambiguously, and the sign of dT * /dg is ambiguous.
Spillovers
Although the tone of our discussion thus far suggests ROS welfare is increasing in regulatory stringency, firm activity may also generate positive spillovers. For example, the foreign exchange earnings of exporting firms can alleviate devaluation pressures on local currencies.
Alternately, innovative firms generate knowledge spillovers that can raise factor productivity sector-wide. We capture the tendency of a firm to generate regulation-inhibiting spillovers to ROS via the parameter n. Differentiating (1), (3) and (5) gives
indicating that threatpoint and equilibrium regulation are both decreasing in the extent of a firm's positive production spillovers, with ambiguous effects on exerted influence and equilibrium transfers.
Competition
Thus far we have implicitly assumed regulations are firm-specific. In reality, businesses also face regulatory interference in the form of sector-wide regulations that impinge on all firms active in the firm's industry. This makes it costly to weaken regulations across the board for the benefit of the politically active firm-holding constant the scale of that firm's activity-when there are a large number of other firms active in that same sector. An accurate treatment of the multiple-firm problem would model the potential for collective action, allowing for the endogenous formation of (multiple) lobby groups, a vector of regulations (some of which are firm-specific and some of which are sector-wide), and interactions between firms in downstream markets. This is outside the scope of our analysis. However, we can offer some predictions as to how the presence of industry-level competition affects a single firm's equilibrium influence and interference if we are willing to impose the following assumptions on our model. Specifically, we assume that the firm's competitors do not lobby the regulator themselves, competition does not affect pi (X) (i.e. the marginal effect of regulation on the firm's own profits), and regulatory scale economies occur at the plant level only. In what follows we also hold constant the scale of the politically active firm's activity, setting δ = 1 for clarity. Under the aformentioned assumptions, we can adapt the model to account for industry-wide regulation by introducing a simple scale parameter ψ and writing
, where z = z (1), and keeping the form of R unchanged from before. In this formulation, regulation-augmenting and -inhibiting spillovers are increasing in ψ, as are regulatory costs and sector-level profits;
the politically-active firms own profits are independent of ψ. Under this formulation, we have dX
ψ[s +bπ +nN −e z] < 0. One proxy for the scale of other-firm activity is the number of competitors in the firm's industry. Under this interpretation, our model suggests that a firm's equilibrium regulation will be increasing in the amount of competition it faces, while its exerted influence will decline.
Data
Our empirical analysis uses the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a survey of over 10,000 firms in 80 countries and one territory conducted in 1999-2000. The survey was conducted though face-to-face interviews with firm managers and owners and covers a large range of questions concerning the firm's relationship with the government, including perceptions of regulations, corruption, influence, macroeconomic policies, competition, and infrastructure. 4 We use data from all countries except those in Africa and the Middle East as these regions do not have data on firm beliefs about influence on government. The countries for which there was at least one firm with all the data required for our base specification are listed in Table 10 in the Appendix. Definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis are discussed in this section. Motivation for choice of variables and hypotheses are given in Section 5.
Influence over Government
Since exerted influence is endogenous in our model we are interested in how influence depends on firm characteristics. The WBES asked managers for each of the Executive, Legislature, Ministry and Regulatory Agency of the national government of the country in which they were operating:
"When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your firm typically have at the national level of government on the content of that law, rule, regulation or decree? Would you say very influential, frequently influential, influential, seldom influential or never influential?" Summary statistics reported in Table 1 show that for all four branches of government most firms feel that they are "Never" influential. The four branches of government appear to have very similar levels of susceptibility to influence. 
Regulatory Constraint
The 
Explanatory Variables
The WBES data contains a number of firm characteristics which we might expect to be associated with a firm's ability to influence government decisions and its experience of regulatory constraint. The motivation for including and hypotheses related to each of the selected right hand side variables is discussed in Section 5. In the current section we describe the variables and present summary statistics. The variables on the right hand side in our base regressions are:
7
• Size: coded 1 for small (5 − 50 employees), 2 for medium (51 − 500 employees) and 3
for large (> 500 employees),
• Government: coded 1 if firms reported having any share of government ownership, 0 otherwise,
• Exporter: coded 1 if firms export some product, 0 otherwise,
• Foreign: coded 1 if firms report at least 10% foreign ownership, 0 otherwise,
• Multi-country: coded 1 if firms report having operations or holdings in other countries, 0 otherwise,
• Age: coded 1 for 0 − 5 years, 2 for 6 − 20 years, and 3 for more than 20 years firm age,
• Sector: manufacturing, services, agriculture, construction, and other, 7 We also make use of a number of other variables from the WBES in our robustness checks. Variables used in the robustness checks are discussed in Section 5.1.
• Number of competitors: coded 0 for no competitors, 1 for one to three competitors and 3 for more than three competitors,
8
• Capital intensity as measured by the ratio of reported value of sales to fixed assets 9 , and
• Country of operation of respondent firm.
Since the variables are almost exclusively categorical, 10 they are summarized as their component binary variables in Table 3 where the mean value is the fraction of reporting firms which are in that category. Countries included in the analysis are listed in Table 10 in the Appendix. Table 3 shows that sample size and proportion in each category are sufficient for identification of regression coefficients. In some cases -for example foreign firms -this is the result of intentional over-sampling in the survey design.
Given that much of the political economy literature has concentrated on the action of groups rather than firms, we may be concerned that only large firms have any political influence. Table 4 presents a cross-tabulation of firm size with our maximum influence variable and shows that while larger firms tend to be more influential, there are non-negligible proportions of small and medium sized firms which also consider themselves influential. Even among small firms nearly 40% report having at least some influence.
Empirical Approach
Since both influence and regulatory constraint measures are ordered categorical variables we use a robust ordered probit estimator for both sets of regressions. 11 The right hand side variables in our base regressions are defined in Section 4.3. All categorical explanatory variables were included in the regressions as sets of dummies. The remainder of these section Firm size has the most direct connection to our model of any of the variables in the WBES survey. Firm size is directly interpretable as δ in our model. Accordingly we expect size to be correlated positively with both influence and regulatory constraint when there are economies of scale in regulation. We classify environmental, labor and fire regulations as areas with high economies of scale for the regulator since travel for on-site inspection is required for monitoring.
Government ownership also has a fairly direct interpretation in our model. Governments internalize costs and benefits to firms (or parts thereof) which they own, which we interpret as a higher franchise b in the theoretical model. The comparative static results are that higher franchise increases intrinsic influence, lowers equilibrium regulation, and reduces exerted influence. Additionally, because governments are more likely to own firms which provide public goods, we expect government owned firms to have higher n on average, which reduces equilibrium regulation and has ambiguous effects on exerted influence. Overall we cannot make unambiguous predictions about the relationship between government ownership and influence, though it seems likely that the positive effects on intrinsic influence will dominate. The model does, however, unambiguously predict that government owned firms will experience less regulatory constraint.
Exporting firms earn foreign exchange; empirical evidence suggests many governments view these earning as a positive spillover, suggesting n is higher for Exporters. As per Melitz (2003), exporters may have higher productivity than average, suggesting δ is higher for exporters, holding inputs (i.e. employment) constant. High δ argues in favor of more regulatory constraint and greater exerted influence, while high n suggests less regulatory constraint and ambiguous impact on influence. On net, the predicted correlations between exporter status and the dependent variables influence and regulatory constraint are ambiguous.
Multi-country firms (those which have operations or holdings in other countries) have been argued to be particularly proficient political operators due to factors such as scale economies and learning by doing in loggying efforts (Boddewyn 1988, Desbordes and Vauday 2007 ). In our model lobbying efficiency is represented by lower values of g, suggesting greater influence and lower regulatory constraint.
Foreign owned firms, like firms that operate abroad, may have lower lobbying costs, g, due to scale economies arising from lobbying activities overseas. Lower g leads to increased influence and decreased equilibrium regulation. Foreign firms are also more likely to be politically disenfranchised, leading to low intrinsic influence b. Lowering b has ambiguous effects on influence but unambiguously increases equilibrium regulation. Moreover, there is a significant literature suggesting foreign multinationals bring positive spillovers via technology transfer, corresponding to high n. Increasing n also has ambiguous effects on influence but it lowers equilibrium regulation. Overall, we cannot make any unambiguous predictions about the relationship between foreign ownership and either influence or equilibrium regulation.
Age. If there is learning by doing in lobbying then older firms may have lower g and thus greater influence and less regulatory constraint. On the other hand, old firms may be less innovative, suggesting n is lower for old firms, arguing in favor of greater regulatory constraint and ambiguous effects on influence. On net, all predictions with regard to age are ambiguous.
Competition. The degree of competition in a sector reflects the amount of extra-firm activity affected by sector-wide regulations constraining an individual firm. Stated differently, the number of competitors proxies the extent of collective action failures. Accordingly, we expect firms with competition to exhibit higher ψ, face greater regulatory constraint, and exert less influence.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize our empirical predictions. 
Robustness Checks and Empirical Issues
Numerous additional variables from the WBES dataset were used to test the robustness of the results obtained in our base specification. Some of these robustness checks addressed potential omitted variable biases due to other determinants of influence, while others addressed potential survey-related biases such as representativeness of sampling and general optimism of the respondent.
Three previous papers by Chong and Gradstein (2007) , Campos and Giovannoni (2007) and Desai and Olofsgard (2008) have used the same or similar data from the World Bank to ask questions related to firm influence over government. Between them these papers included a number of potential determinants of influence which are not included in our base specification. These variables included lobby group membership, the concentration of ownership of the firm, the legal organization of the company, whether the headquarters of the firm were located in a capital city, the firm's attitudes towards irregular "additional payments"
to government, and how predictable the firm views changes in rules, laws and regulations to be. While an argument could be made for each of these variables as a determinant of influence, we have not included them in our base regression either due to endogeneity concerns (e.g. firms may resort to "additional payments" if they do not have other means of influence) or due to missing values excessively reducing the sample size (legal organization of the company, location of headquarters and concentration of ownership), or simply because the variable was not available in the WBES dataset (lobby group membership). Rather than include these variables in our base specification we have run a series of robustness checks including different combinations of these variables. We find they have minor quantitative and no qualitative impact on our findings.?? 12 ??
In addition to other potential determinants of firm influence, Desai and Olofsgard (2008) pay close attention to the problems of comparability when respondents are asked to use 12 Results of these regressions are available on request from the authors.
ordinal response categories. They note that "Different respondents may interpret concepts such as "influence" in vastly different ways based on unobservable characteristics ("culture," socialization, etc.). Ordinal scales may mean different things to different respondents based on idiosyncratic factors such as mood or overall optimism." (Desai and Olofsgard 2008, p.13) Consequently the authors employ two methods to correct for the potential biases arising from idiosyncratic respondent differences in reporting influence on an ordinal scale. Firstly they construct their influence variable as a deviation from the respondent's perception of their own firm's influence and that of other firms' influence. This approach is not available to us as the WBES data does not contain responses to questions about the influence of other firms.
The second technique Desai and Olofsgard (2008) use to address idiosyncratic respondent differences is to try to control for the overall optimism of the respondent by including variables which they believe should affect all firms equally. Specifically, they use the managers' responses to questions about the degree to which they view macroeconomic instability (specifically inflation) and economic policy uncertainty as constraints to their business as proxies for the propensity of the respondent to complain. Both of these variables are available to us in the WBES data, however, it is not altogether clear ex ante that the impact of macroeconomic instability or economic policy uncertainty should be the same for all types of firms. In particular, it seems likely that the impact of these variables might vary systematically with our variables of interest, namely foreign connections. Thus we do not include these variables in our base regression, but do include them in our robustness checks. Our robustness checks also included two alternative proxies for the overall optimism of the respondents, namely how problematic they consider street crime/theft/disorder, and organized crime/Mafia for the operation and growth of their business.
An additional source of bias which is not discussed by Desai and Olofsgard (2008) is unobserved heterogeneity in the respondents' general attitudes toward the government in the country of operation. These attitudes may vary for cultural or historical reasons, as well as due to the respondent's personal experiences outside the management of their firm.
Including proxies for these attitudes in the base regression specification is not justified as reverse causality from success in influencing government to general attitudes may bias the coefficients. On the other hand, ignoring this source of heterogeneity may lead to omitted variable bias. Thus we run an additional robustness check in which we include a number of proxies for general attitude toward government, namely the responses to the questions:
• Please evaluate the following statement: "The process of developing new rules, regulations or policies is usually such that businesses are informed in advance of changes affecting them." This is true: always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never.
• Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in economic and financial policies which materially affect your business? Responses were on a six-point scale from completely predictable to completely unpredictable.
• Please rate your overall perception of the relation between government and/or bureaucracy and private firms on the following scale. "All in all, for doing business I perceive the state as": very helpful, mildly helpful, neutral, mildly unhelpful, very unhelpful.
The question was asked separately for national and local governments.
Since none of our attempts to address unobserved respondent heterogeneity had any material effect on our results we do not report them in the paper. 13 Our interpretation of the finding of no effect on our coefficients of interest is that although unobserved respondent heterogeneity is certainly present, it did not cause bias because it was not correlated with our explanatory variables of interest. Table 7 reports coefficients and standard errors for the base specification with dependent variables in columns 1 − 4 being influence over Executive, Legislature, Ministry, and Regulator. The dependent variable in column 5 is the maximum influence reported by the firm across any of the four branches of government. For our coefficients of interest, the results in all five columns are consistent in terms of sign, significance 14 and -in most cases -magnitude.
Results
Results Summary
As predicted by our model, medium and large firms are significantly more influential than small firms. The difference between the medium and large firm coefficients is sufficiently 13 Please contact the author for these results.
14 With the exception of the competition coefficients when influence on the Regulator is the dependent variable.
large relative to the standard errors that we can say large firms are also significantly more influential than medium-sized firms. Also consistent with our model predictions we see that increasing competition for a firm in associated with less influence over government. This relationship is statistically significant for all branches of government except the regulatory branch.
The variables Government, Exporter, Foreign, Multi-country, Middle-aged and Old all have interpretations within our model as described in Section 5, however the model did not provide unambiguous predictions about the signs of these coefficients. However, government ownership, multi-country operations, exporting, and -to a lesser extent -old firms do have significant positive relationships with influence in our regressions. Government ownership, and multi-country operations are particularly strongly positively associated with influence, with both having coefficients larger than that for medium size.
Our model did not provide any guidance on the relative influence of firms in different sectors, but we do see that firms in the services sector and -to a lesser extent -construction firms report significantly greater influence than the excluded manufacturing firms. Tables 8 and 9 report coefficients for the ordered probit regressions of constraint caused by regulation across a range of areas. The regulatory areas in Table 8 are environment, labor, and fire -all of which we suggest are characterized by economies of scale for the regulator. The regulatory areas in Table 9 are business licensing, high taxes, tax administration/regulation, foreign exchange regulations, and customs & trade regulations. We classify these areas as being less characterized by economies of scale in regulation. Some of the explanatory variables display fairly consistent relationships across the range of regulatory areas in Tables   8 and 8 , others are consistent within each of the two tables and others have more variable coefficients.
In all eight different regulatory areas the coefficients on few competitors and many competitors are positive and in most cases significantly different from zero. This provides strong evidence that monopolists enjoy less regulatory constraint than other firms -a finding which is consistent with our hypotheses in Section 5. The coefficients on the age variables are also consistent across the range of regulatory areas, but in this case they are consistently indistinguishable from zero. 15 We had not predicted a significant relationship between age and regulatory constraint since age may lower regulatory constraint by firms becoming more efficient at lobbying over time, but age may raise regulatory constraint to the extent that older firms innovate less and thus generate less positive spillovers.
The globalization variables -exporting, foreign ownership, and multi-country operations -all show slight evidence of lowering regulatory constraint. 16 Although the results are not particularly strong, they are consistent with the predictions of our model given the assumption that governments perceive positive spillovers from the operations of these types of firms and/or that these firms are more efficient at making transfers to governments due to their experience in other countries.
Finally, there are some coefficients which are consistent within either Table 8 or 9, but not between the two. As predicted by our model, increasing firm size is associated with significantly higher levels of regulatory constraint in Table 8 -where we believe there are economies of scale for the regulator. By comparison, with the exception of the positive effect in the Customs and Trade regulation regression, the coefficients on the size variables in Table   9 are insignificantly different from zero. The finding that larger firms are no more nor less constrained than other firms in regulatory areas where there are not significant economies of scale for the regulator is also consistent with the predictions of our model.
Interestingly the coefficient on government ownership also differs systematically between Tables 8 and 9 . In Table 9 government ownership is consistently negatively associated with regulatory constraint -as predicted by our model. However, in Table 8 government ownership appears unrelated to regulatory constraint. One possible explanation for this non-result in these areas is that the environmental, labor and fire safety performance of government firms is potentially more visible to the public than the other regulatory areas, and that there is an expectation that publicly-owned companies will perform well in these areas.
Conclusion
Do corporations influence regulators? Probably. Do influential firms fare better than less influential ones? Maybe-it depends on why these firms are influential in the first place. We develop a simple theoretical model that explores the endogeneity of political influence. We identify firm-level primitives-size, age, ownership composition, and exporter status-which simultaneously determine the extent to which the firm influences, and faces interference from, regulators. Our model reveals that one of the characteristics that makes a firm influential- its size-may also attract regulatory constraint, generating a positive correlation between influence and interference. Conversely, when high influence is instead the result of positive production spillovers, low lobbying frictions, market monopoly, or high enfranchisement, our model predicts influence and interference correlate negatively.
We test our predictions using the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPs). With regards to environmental, labor, and safety regulations, we find that large firms consistently report greater influence and greater interference than do smaller firms. We find little evidence of an influence of firm size on interference for other forms of regulation such as business licensing, tax levels and regulations, and trade-related regulations. In contrast, government ownership consistently corresponds to less regulatory constraint and greater influence, likely reflecting such firms' high intrinsic influence. We similarly find that exporting and multicountry firms report high levels of influence, but there is little evidence that these outwardoriented firms face less regulatory constraint.
Our results suggest a high degree of endogeneity in reported measures of firm-level influence over government regulations, and that empirical efforts to measure the causal effects of influence on regulatory outcomes must first account for sources of contemperaneous correlation such as size, ownership status and outward orientation. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
